

AVA TASKER-MITCHELL,

Appellant

v.

SOMERSET COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Appellee.

BEFORE THE

MARYLAND

STATE BOARD

OF EDUCATION

Opinion No. 25-39

OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant, superintendent of Somerset County Public Schools, appeals her placement on paid administrative leave and her termination by the Somerset County Board of Education (“local board”). The local board filed a motion to dismiss the administrative leave appeal as moot and a motion to dismiss the termination appeal as untimely. The local board also filed a substantive response to the termination appeal. Appellant responded and the local board replied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2024, Appellant and the local board entered into an employment contract for Appellant to serve a four-year term as superintendent of Somerset County Public Schools (“SCPS”) that began on July 1, 2024. (Appeal, Ex. 1 at 1)¹. The contract provides that it may be terminated upon the removal of Appellant from her position for immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination, incompetency, or willful neglect of duty, in accordance with the provisions of Educ. Art. §4-201(e). *Id.* at 16.

On or about May 20, 2025, Appellant filed a request for the State Board to remove Matthew Lankford as a member of the local board. (LB Resp., Ex. 5). Mr. Lankford serves as chair of the local board.²

On June 3, 2025, the local board unanimously voted to remove Appellant from her position as superintendent based on insubordination and incompetency thereby terminating her from her position. (LB Mtn., Ex.1). By letter dated June 4, 2025, the local board advised Appellant of the removal decision pursuant to Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(1), stating as follows:

The Board has considered this decision in-depth, including your unilateral statement caught on an “open mic” incident in December 2024 that you had deleted

¹ Current board members Matthew Lankford, Mary Beth Bozman, and John Robertson were not on the board at the time the contract was executed. Mr. Robertson was not on the board at the time of the termination and hearing.

² The State Board issued a decision in the Lankford removal case on the same date as this decision. *See In the Matter of Request for Removal of Local Board Member Matthew Lankford*, MSBE Op. No. 25-40 (2025).

from the recording, and which caused much consternation among parents and educators at Deal Island; your decisions to delete public comments, potentially violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; your failure to join important phone/virtual meetings without excuse, including meeting with Maryland Director of ICE after you unilaterally posted a controversial statement regarding immigration on the school website; your outright refusal to remove that statement when told to do so by the Chair and Vice Chair and, after finally removing it, following up the controversy with robocalls/texts to parents regarding ICE enforcement raids.

The board also considered your inability to foster a working relationship with the current Chairman, having his entry badge deactivated and alerting him and other Board members of your subjective fear for your safety when he is in the building; a fear that the Board considers is objectively unreasonable if not intentionally subversive. This unwillingness to meet him in person – in the BOE building – is indicative of a dysfunctional relationship that cannot be allowed to continue.

Furthermore, you have consistently opposed and failed to recruit a Deputy Superintendent after a year in your position as superintendent. Although you may feel that you don't need to fill this singly important staff position, having a deputy is not only critical to the functioning of the schools during normal circumstances, but particularly if you are temporarily incapacitated in some manner or otherwise unable to temporarily fulfill your duties. There will be no one trained and experienced to assume your duties in your absence. This is unacceptable and inexcusable.

This narrative is non exhaustive, and other incidents and performance failures have contributed in the aggregate to this termination decision.

Id. The local board sent the termination letter to Appellant by email that same day and attached other documentation to the email consisting of an evaluation letter, the Appellant's evaluation for 2024-2025, and a zip drive of evaluation documentation containing multiple documents on eight general topics each preceded by a cover page identifying the topic. The topics involved the Deal Island "open mic" incident; budget matters; statements made by the board chairman in his evaluation regarding the working relationship with Appellant; the posting of immigration enforcement action information; the drafting of procedures; current policy enforcement; board attorneys; and Appellant's handling, preparation, and conduct of meetings. (LB Resp., Exs. 2 and 4). The termination letter advised that Appellant could request a hearing before the local board within ten days of the date of the letter and that Appellant could appeal the decision to the State Board.³ (LB Mtn., Ex. 1). The letter further advised that Appellant could resign in lieu of termination within five days of the letter date. *Id.*

On June 5, 2025, Appellant appealed the removal decision terminating her employment to the local board. (Appeal, Ex. 3).

³ The reference to the hearing notice mistakenly cited §4-202(4)(i) and (ii) of the Education Article rather than §4-201(c)(4)(i) and (ii).

On June 6, 2025, State Superintendent of Schools, Carey M. Wright, stayed the local board's removal decision for sixty calendar days to preserve the status quo during the ongoing local board hearing process and any subsequent legal proceedings. *See In the Matter of Ava Tasker-Mitchell, Sup't. of Schs.*, Sup't. Order No. 25-01 (2025). (LB Resp. Ex. 1).

During June 2025, there were various communications between the attorneys for the Appellant and the local board as they attempted to schedule the hearing required by Educ. Art. §4-201. *See* Resp. to Prelim. Mtn., Ex. 6. Ultimately, the parties settled on a July 15, 2025 hearing date. The emails included indications from local board counsel of what would transpire both during and after the hearing. In one of the emails on June 6, local board counsel stated that "according to the statute – we'll need to set up a hearing for the [local board] to affirm or reject the removal no earlier than ten days after filing her request." *Id.* In another email on June 6 he stated that there might be questions from board members during the hearing "that may actually give rise to substantiating [the Appellant's] argument that she not be removed" and that "[s]ome members may change their minds based on that interaction..." *Id.* He also stated that "[f]ollowing the hearing, [the local board] will only be either affirming or rescinding their decision to remove her as super. She may then appeal an adverse decision to the State." *Id.* He further stated that "their position as the Board gives them both the authority to hear Dr. Tasker Mitchell's rebuttal why their decision to remove her was not warranted, to ask questions that they may have, and then to either reverse or affirm their decision." *Id.* In a June 9 email, he stated that "[w]hen the hearing is over, the Board members will consider everything while in closed session and make a determination to remove or to retain her as [superintendent]." *Id.*

On June 11, 2025, the local board sent Appellant an email with an attached letter indicating it included additional supplemental documentation for her hearing on July 15, 2025. (Appeal, Ex. 12). The supplemental documentation is an undated letter regarding the budget stating that Appellant's "actions were unacceptable and represent insubordination, misconduct, dereliction of duty, and incompetence." (Appeal, Ex. 13). On June 14, 2025, the local board sent Appellant another email with an attached letter indicating it included additional supplemental documentation for her hearing. (Appeal, Ex. 14). The supplemental documentation is a letter referencing a vendor contract which states "Your dereliction of duty, incompetence and abandonment of the official proceedings without being properly excused from attending this hearing during your normal and ordinary business hours will be added to the charges of your termination proceedings...." (Appeal, Ex. 39). On June 23, 2025, the local board sent Appellant an email regarding her actions during a meeting stating that her "actions were clearly insubordinate." (Appeal, Ex. 15).

On July 7, 2025, the local board voted to place Appellant on paid administrative leave until July 23, 2025.⁴ (Appeal, Ex.6). The letter advising Appellant of the decision stated that the action was intended to ensure that Mr. Lankford and his attorney "are afforded a fair and equal opportunity to prepare his defense in response to the [removal] petition" filed by Appellant with the State Board. *Id.* Mr. Lankford recused himself from the deliberations and abstained from voting on the matter. *Id.* On July 9, 2025, Dr. Wright, stayed the local board's administrative leave decision for sixty calendar days. *See In the Matter of Ava Tasker-Mitchell, Sup't. of Schs.*, Sup't. Order No. 25-02 (2025). (Appeal, Ex. 9).

⁴ The July 23 date was Mr. Lankford's initial deadline for responding to the request for his removal from the local board.

On July 15, 2025, Appellant had her hearing on her removal before the local board. (App's. Resp. to Motion, Ex. 4). The local board did not issue a verbal or written decision after the hearing. The local board stated in its Request to Lift Stay of Termination of Employment that "no Board member made any motion, and no subsequent decisions were contemplated, discussed, or voted on" and that "The Board's 6/3/25 Decision to terminate [Appellant's] employment and remove her as superintendent thus remains unchanged and continues in effect....". *Id.*

After learning that the local board was not going to issue a decision, Appellant filed this appeal with the State Board on July 17, 2025. (Appeal). The appeal has been fully briefed by the parties.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The State Board exercises its independent judgment on the record before it in the explanation and interpretation of the public school laws and the State Board regulations. COMAR 13A.01.05.06E.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Preliminary Matter - Motion to Recuse

As a preliminary matter, the local board has filed a motion for State Board president Joshua Michael and State Board member Chet Chesterfield to recuse themselves from adjudicating the appeal and any preliminary motions pending before the State Board based on their September 2, 2025 visit to SCPS where they toured several schools with the Maryland State Department of Education's Assistant Superintendent of Instructional Programs, Dr. Elise Brown, led by the Appellant. (Motion to Recuse at 2). Mr. Chesterfield has recused himself for reasons unrelated to the motion. Mr. Michael has not recused himself as the September 2 visit was conducted as part of his regular and official functions as a member of the State Board visiting school systems at the start of the school year. There were no *ex parte* communications regarding any matters pending before the State Board and the visit does not create the appearance of impropriety or a conflict of interest. Mr. Michael is able to fairly and impartially adjudicate the matter.

Motion to Dismiss Termination Appeal

The local board has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for untimely filing arguing that Appellant failed to appeal her termination within 30 days of the date of the local board's June 3, 2025 decision to remove her from her position.

COMAR 13A.01.05.02B(1) provides that an appeal to the State Board "shall be filed within 30 calendar days of the decision of the local board" and that the "30 days shall run from the later of the date of the order or the opinion reflecting the decision." An appeal is deemed transmitted within the limitations period if, before the expiration of the time period, it has been delivered or submitted electronically to the State Board, deposited in the U.S. Mail as registered,

certified or Express, or deposited with a delivery service that provides verifiable tracking from the point of origin. COMAR 13A.01.05.02B(3). Time limitations are generally mandatory and will not be overlooked except in extraordinary circumstances such as fraud or lack of notice. *See Scott v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty.*, 3 Ops. MSBE 139 (1983); COMAR 13A.01.05.04B(2) (“The State Board may not extend the time period for filing an appeal from the decision of the local board . . . except in the case of fraud, lack of notice of the decision, or other extraordinary circumstances.”).

The local board issued its decision on June 3, 2025. Under regular circumstances Appellant should have filed her appeal to the State Board by July 3. Appellant, however, argues that the circumstances in this case are anything but regular and that they excuse the late filing. Appellant maintains that the local board’s failure to render a decision on her removal from the superintendent position after the July 15 hearing took place is inconsistent with representations by local board counsel, violates her due process rights and violates State law and constitutes lack of notice of the local board’s decision and/or an extraordinary circumstance which excuses the late filing. The local board argues that Appellant had notice of its June 3 pre-hearing decision on her removal and that no extraordinary circumstances exist here, pointing out that the State Board has strictly enforced the timeliness rule unless extraordinary circumstances like the imminent death of a spouse created such an emotional and time-sensitive situation that the failure to timely file was excusable. *See Curtis v. Caroline Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, MSBE Op. No. 25-13 (2025). We address whether lack of notice and/or the existence of extraordinary circumstances justify the late filing by examining the underlying issue concerning the sequence of the local board’s decision and the hearing.

The parties have differing views of what was required here in terms of the timing of the local board termination decision and the hearing as it relates to Constitutional due process rights and the statutory requirements of Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(4). The local board refers to the hearing as a “post-termination hearing” and is of the view that the hearing satisfied due process and statutory requirements because it provided Appellant a hearing, regardless of the fact that the hearing took place after the local board issued its removal decision terminating Appellant’s employment. On the other hand, Appellant is of the view that the local board violated her due process rights and the provisions of Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(4) by failing to render a post-hearing decision as to her removal from her position, thereby rendering the hearing process meaningless.

Due Process Requirements for Pretermination Notice and Hearing

An essential principle of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” *Cleveland Bd. of Educ., v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)(citing *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 339 (1950)). In *Loudermill*, the Supreme Court affirmed that a public employee with a property interest in their continued employment cannot be deprived of that property interest without due process of law. *Id.* (citing *Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft*, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978); *Goss v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 538 (1975)). Due process requires that the employee receive oral or written notice of the charges against them and a pretermination hearing. *Id.* at 542-543, 547. Critical to the due process requirement is that the hearing occur before the termination.

The pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge, rather it serves as an initial check against mistaken decisions to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. *Id.* at 545-546. The opportunity for the employee to present their side of the case prior to termination is “recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision” as dismissals for cause often include factual disputes and, even if the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be and “the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect.” *Id.* at 543. Presumptive in this process is that the termination decision be rendered after the hearing and not before to avoid a predetermined result that renders the hearing requirement meaningless and the employee unable to seek appellate review.

The post-hearing decision should convey the basis and rationale for the local board’s decision in order for the State Board to conduct a meaningful review on appeal and to ensure legal sufficiency of the administrative review process. See *Donna Young v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, MSBE Op, No. 17-12 (2017); *Richardson v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs*, MSBE Op. No. 13-29 (2013); *Mohan G. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, MSBE Op. No. 08-15 (2008). This allows us to understand the specific reasons for removal and how the local board reached its post-hearing decision after considering the information Appellant presented in response to the charges against her.

Procedural Safeguards in Education Article §4-201(e)

Pursuant to Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(1)(i) – (v), the local board may remove the county superintendent for immorality; misconduct in office; insubordination; incompetency; or willful neglect of duty. However, the local board’s removal of the county superintendent is subject to specific statutory procedural safeguards that include the right to a hearing before the removal decision is finalized. Section 4-201(e)(4) states:

- (i) A county board may remove a county superintendent under this subsection if the county board provides the county superintendent with:
 - 1. The reason for removal, chosen from one or more of the items in paragraph (1) of this subsection;
 - 2. Documentation supporting the case for removal; and
 - 3. The opportunity to request a hearing within 10 days before the county board in accordance with this subsection.
- (ii) The county superintendent may appeal the decision of the county board to the State Board.

Statutory interpretation begins and ends with ascertaining the intent of the Legislature. *Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 431 Md. 347, 358 (2013). The first level of that inquiry involves the plain language of the statute. The plain language of the statute often manifests the legislative intent. *State v. Bey*, 452 Md. 255, 265 (2017). In ascertaining intent, we do not read the words of the statute in a vacuum. *Lockshin v. Semsker*, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010). Instead, we interpret the language in light of the “context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” If the statutory language, read in context, “is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent

purpose” the inquiry will “ordinarily” end, “and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction.” *Lockshin*, 412 Md. at 275.

The plain language of Educ. Art. §4-201(e) clearly contemplates that no final removal decision may be made by the local board until after the hearing, if one is requested. Thus, the hearing is a precondition to a lawful removal. In effect, placing the *Loudermill* due process requirement into statute. It also makes clear that there is a two-part process consisting of a hearing before the local board, if requested, which occurs prior to the termination decision, followed by an opportunity to appeal the local board’s termination decision to the State Board.

Discussion

Appellant has a property interest in her employment with the school system as she can only be terminated for cause based on the requirements of her employment contract and State law. This triggers *Loudermill* protections that entitle her to pre-termination notice and the opportunity to be heard consistent with the due process principles explained above. Additionally, pursuant to Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(4)(i)(3), the Appellant is entitled to a hearing before the local board prior to the local board’s termination decision. Due process requires that the hearing be a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a final decision is made by the employer, not a post removal formality. Skipping the step of rendering a post-hearing decision undermines the due process protections embedded in both the Constitution and Maryland law.

In this case, on June 3 the local board removed Appellant from her position as superintendent, thus terminating her employment before the hearing took place. The local board later held a hearing on July 15, but the local board took no action regarding the removal after the hearing. There was no post-hearing motion or vote to remove the Appellant thereby rendering the hearing requirement meaningless with a predetermined outcome. Because the Appellant was entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the law, the local board’s termination of the Appellant on June 3 without first providing her with the opportunity to be heard was a violation of due process requirements and the requirements of Educ. Art. §4-201 and undermines the very purpose of the hearing requirement. Thus, the June 3 decision is illegal. The failure to provide due process erodes trust in the institution and prolongs uncertainty for the school community.

In addition to the Constitutional and statutory requirements, we have described in the factual background above the multiple representations made by local board counsel in his email communications with Appellant’s counsel that the local board would be rendering a decision on Appellant’s removal after the hearing. He stated that the local board will be “either affirming or rescinding their decision to remove” and that Appellant “may then appeal an adverse decision to the State.” (Resp. to Prelim. Mtn., Ex. 6.). Counsel also stated that the statute requires the local board “to set up a hearing for the Board to affirm or reject the removal...” *Id.* He also indicated that after hearing Appellant’s rebuttal and asking questions that the board will “either reverse or affirm their decision.” *Id.* Further, he stated that “[w]hen the hearing is over, the Board members will consider everything while in closed session and make a determination to remove or to retain her as [superintendent].” *Id.* Appellant reasonably relied on all of these representations in believing that the local board would be rendering a post-hearing decision. There was no reason for her to think she should note an appeal to the State Board from the June 3 letter, particularly

since the representations by counsel that the local board would issue a post-hearing decision on the removal were consistent with Appellant's due process rights and State law.

This case presents an unusual scenario for the State Board that does not fit neatly into our usual paradigm. Although there is a local board decision, that decision was issued before providing Appellant her procedural rights. Failure to render a decision after the hearing reduced the hearing requirement to a mere formality undermining its purpose. Appellant's reasonable expectation was that the local board would be issuing a post-hearing decision that would then be appealable to the State Board. That reasonable expectation was based not only on long ingrained Constitutional due process principles and Maryland statutory requirements in Educ. Art. §4-201(e), but also on direct statements from the local board's attorney that after the hearing the local board would either affirm or reverse their decision. We find that this unique set of facts and circumstances constitutes lack of notice of the local board's decision and/or extraordinary circumstances that justify piercing the 30-day appeal deadline. Unlike our prior rulings that have focused more on personal circumstances, the extraordinary circumstances here were created by the local board's procedural anomalies.

Given the totality of the unusual confluence of events, we do not dismiss the appeal for untimeliness. However, given the local board's violations of due process and statutory requirements based on the local board's failure to issue a post-hearing decision, we remand the case to the local board for it to issue a final written decision that can be reviewed on appeal. To find otherwise would allow local boards to undermine the procedural framework and engage in strategic maneuvers designed to deprive local superintendents of their Constitutional and statutory rights and frustrate their ability to timely engage appellate review.⁵

Type of Hearing Required

The parties disagree about the type of hearing required in this case.⁶ Appellant maintains that a full, evidentiary hearing is appropriate to the nature of her case given that she is the highest-ranking employee in the school system and under a four-year contract. The local board maintains that Appellant was entitled to something less elaborate in which Appellant could respond to the charges and present reasons why she should not be removed from her position. Neither Educ. Art. §4-201(e)(4)(i)(3), Appellant's employment contract, nor State Board regulations explain the type of hearing intended by the process. However, as pointed out in *Loudermill*, the formality of the procedural requisites for the hearing can vary depending upon the important interest involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. *Cleveland Bd. of Educ., v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. at 545. In general, something less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action and an employee with a vested property right is entitled to a limited pre-termination hearing that is an "initial check against mistaken decisions" and a more comprehensive post-termination hearing. *Id.* The pre-termination hearing allows the employee to present their side of the story after receiving notice of the charges or

⁵ The Appellant also filed a Request to Extend Time, or In the Alternative, Request to Remand seeking to extend the 30-day appeal filing deadline. We need not consider this redundant filing as the arguments are identical to those raised in Appellant's response to the local board's motion to dismiss the appeal.

⁶ The parties' pleadings reveal much confusion about the procedural posture of the hearing most likely due to the fact that the case before the local board was procedurally out of step with the issuance of a decision before the hearing occurred.

reasons for the termination. *Id.* at 546. The hearing at issue in this case is a pre-termination hearing in which the local board is making the removal decision in the first instance.⁷ The local board's decision is reviewable on appeal to the State Board with opportunity for an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes of fact, and the State Board's decision is reviewable on appeal to the Circuit Court. The local board provided Appellant with a hearing at which she was represented by counsel, provided sworn testimony, and submitted documentary evidence. We find that this satisfies the due process and statutory hearing requirement.⁸

Appeal of Placement on Administrative Leave is Moot

The Appellant also filed an appeal of the local board's decision to place her on administrative leave with pay until July 23, 2025. This matter is now moot. The test for mootness is whether "there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the courts [or agency] can provide." *Mallardi v. Carroll Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, MSBE Op. No. 00-07 (2000) (quoting *In Re Michael B.*, 345 Md. 232, 234 (1997)). Because the period of the paid administrative leave expired on July 23, 2025, there is no longer an existing controversy or dispute between the parties on this matter and any controversy that may have existed between the parties regarding the administrative leave is over. Thus, there is no longer an effective remedy that the State Board can provide and the case is moot. *See Deon B. v. Baltimore Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, MSBE Order No. OR19-13 (2019)(finding appeal of local board's decision denying participation in commencement exercises moot because case would not be resolved before commencement exercises were complete).


CONCLUSION


For the reasons stated above, we find that there was lack of notice of the local board's decision and/or extraordinary reasons exist for the late filing of the appeal. We find that the type of hearing the local board provided to Appellant satisfies due process and statutory requirements. However, we find that the local board violated the Appellant's due process rights and Educ. Art. §4-201(e) by failing to issue a post-hearing decision on the removal, thus depriving Appellant of any meaningful review and rendering the decision illegal. We are deeply concerned by the local board's complete disregard of process by failing to follow Constitutional and statutory requirements. Such actions show a disrespect for the rule of law and cannot be tolerated. It is crucial that the local board follow appropriate procedure on critical matters. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the local board for it to render a final decision on the Appellant's removal from her position as superintendent and to issue a written decision reflecting its rationale. The local board shall issue the decision within 30 days of the issuance of this opinion. We further find the appeal of Appellant's placement on paid administrative leave to be moot.

⁷ Although the Appellant draws a parallel between her case and that of employees under the local board's hearing procedures for the suspension or dismissal of tenured employees (local board policy 100-11) and/or the discipline of professionals unit I and II staff (local board policy 700-28), we do not find these policies translatable to a superintendent's removal. The superintendent stands in a different position in that the removal proceedings before the local board are not based on a recommendation for termination by another employee who is presenting a termination case to the local board or the termination of one employee by another employee with the local board reviewing the termination decision on appeal. The local board is the employer making the initial termination decision without recommendation or action by another employee.

⁸ Despite Appellant's request that the hearing be conducted by a hearing examiner or an impartial third party, we find no such requirement.

Finally, as this dispute continues, it is imperative that all parties recommit to cooperation and procedural fidelity, not only to uphold the rule of law but also for the sake of the children whose educational environment is impacted by this unresolved conflict.


Joshua L. Michael
President


Monica Goldson
Vice-President



James Bell


Chuen-Chin Bianca Chang


Kenny Clash


Nick Greer


Irma Johnson


Marcy Leonard


Kim Lewis

Recused:
Chet Chesterfield

Absent:
Xiomara Medina
Samir Paul

Voted:
September 30, 2025

Issued:
October 6, 2025